a more controversial and amorphous field that has experienced a strong renewal in the past decade, under such headings as "flat ontology," "speculative realism,"
and "new realism" -that Gabriel's work seems to be most at home. 4 To further narrow the scope of analysis, one can find valuable help in Peter Wolfendale's remarkable book Object-Oriented Philosophy: The Noumenon's New Clothes, which builds an extremely detailed case against Graham Harman's object-oriented philosophy and its variants, and which analyzes, in its central chapter, the notion of "ontological liberalism," which most aptly describes Gabriel's stance. 5 That term designates, broadly, any philosophical enterprise that aims to confer a positive ontological status on a wide range of objects, including those (for example, mental, social, or fictional objects) that do not fit the commonsense criteria of materiality or substantiality that usually serve to qualify for existence. The aim of ontological liberalism, in its more radical forms, is to extend existence to the greatest possible range of objects, thereby rejecting the principle known as Occam's razor. The natural adversary of this type of ontology might be termed "ontological conservatism," which is dedicated to restraining the ascription of existence exclusively to entities meeting proper explanatory standards. The contrary ambition of the ontological liberal is to achieve descriptive exhaustiveness, that is, to provide a complete catalog of existents without regard to their properties. 6 Historically, ontological liberalism emerges with Alexius Meinong, who gave it an identity distinct from both traditional dogmatic metaphysics and other sorts of antireductionism (notably, Edmund Husserl's).
Confined to a marginal status following Bertrand Russell's scathing criticism of its program, ontological liberalism as a trend crept back into philosophical circles in tandem with the general reevaluation of metaphysics that has marked the decades in the wake, on the analytical side of the aisle, of W. V. Quine and, on the continental side, of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou. 7 Ontological liber-4. I call it a renewal since there have always been metaphysicians and system builders in the "continental" tradition: Bergson, Whitehead and the process-philosophy school (Charles Hartshorne, Justus Buchler, Robert Corrington), Deleuze, and Badiou, as well as less mentioned figures, such as Jean Wahl, Stanislas Breton, Nicolas Berdiaev, and Étienne Souriau. While not all metaphysicians in the strictest or most orthodox sense, they attest to a continuity that is frequently obscured when recent developments are discussed. On this point, see Leon Niemoczynski, "Twenty-First Century Speculative Philosophy: Reflections on the 'New Metaphysics ' and Its Realism and Materialism," Cosmos and History 9, no. 2 (2013) : 13 -31; and Raphaël Millière, "Metaphysics Today and Tomorrow," www.raphaelmilliere.com/pdf/milliere-metaphysics.pdf (accessed April 5, 2016 6. In this context, ontological liberalism should be distinguished from ontological Platonism, which defends only the existence of abstract objects (typically, mathematical entities), and from the more modest forms of antireductionism, which likewise are confined to a limited account of the autonomy of certain classes of objects, usually mental or social. I should also mention the complex relation between liberalism and the various forms of pluralism; while a proper account of this relation would stretch well beyond the limits of my present effort, let me briefly say that liberalism can be seen as one possible justification for pluralism. what follows). I should add that my account will not insist more than is strictly necessary on the evidently important differences between these authors' projects, since my aim is to address those conceptual commitments that they share.
An Ontological Bubble Ending in a Metaphysical Crash
What does it mean to say that the world does not exist? On the most basic level, the statement is a denial of any all-encompassing totality. This philosophical slogan, which epitomizes what Gabriel calls metametaphysical nihilism, is in the same league with Badiou's watchword "The One is not" and with Goodman's dismissal of a "World of worlds." 9 From this refusal of absolute totalization, the ontological liberal is driven headlong to affirm an unlimited number of types of entities susceptible of recognition as real, hence the liberal enthymeme: the world does not exist, therefore everything does. 10 In liberalism, the individual (alternatively, the object or the thing) is the basic unit of ontology, and the main task of ontological liberalism is to elaborate a conception, both exhaustive and consistent, of this individual unit. equally a thing, of what use is it to call them things? For his part, Gabriel refuses an "adverbial" concept of existence that would permit a regulated dose of variation in the concept's usage. For him, to do so would entail positing the world as totality, as a metaphysical medium through which the different kinds of things could interact. 11 Having swept away this intermediary position, he states that anything that does not appear locally (in a given "field of sense") and thus lacks an ontological "site," cannot be said to exist. 12 In this context, to say that the world does not exist is to say that it is not an object: the world, in short, is not a thing in the world. Clearly, we need to elucidate with some precision the notion of existence here employed before shouting from the rooftops, "Where in the universe is the universe?" 13 We are now at the heart of the problem: in order to realize the ontological equality that it espouses, liberalism is committed to finding the most minimal definition of being that is possible. 327) insists strongly on the inadequacy of language, but this claim is strongly undermined by his pivotal use of rigid designators for thinking objects (88) and his adoption of aesthetics as first philosophy.
But, as Wolfendale observes, what the various concepts of being underpinning these definitions (de-determination, alteration, excess, contextuality) share is their fundamentally negative character. They aim to provide an indefinite series of possible extensions and redefinitions, according to the needs of any particular instance, and can reach beyond tautology ("everything exists") only by alluding to the potentially infinite reach of a concept that is, by design, incapable of internal consistency. 18 We can only be thankful for Gabriel's candor when reading his admission that existence, being multiple in its applications, "is just not generally a concept . . . , it is essentially malleable." 19 Its theoretical versatility, in other words, is its only actual content. Moreover, the concept of the object or individual as the basic ontological unit is equally unstable, doomed to shift from an implicitly restrictive definition (by virtue of having any content at all) to specific applications that undermine it by stretching it beyond recognition. Unable to describe or define its generic being in any satisfying way, ontological liberalism is reduced to mere allusion, endlessly repeating a solemn promise that will never be fulfilled. 20 The at best equivocal nature of liberalism's concept of being can be understood, ultimately, as resulting from the reification of discursive features, which then are presented as fundamental traits of being. It is indeed striking that each ontology is heavily dependent on semiotic or linguistic elements. Garcia relies on the distinction between form and content; Harman, on the practice of poetical allusion; Latour, on the plurality of modes of speech -and Gabriel weaponizes the notions of context (for the fields of sense) and connotation (for his notion of sense). 21 The promotion of a semantic category to an ontological status is nowhere advertised as such and is better understood, perhaps, as a collateral effect of abolishing the ontological distinction between words and things, which is an element common (in different versions) to all four philosophies. 22
The indetermination, on both its theoretical and semantic sides, of the con-cept of being is certainly a stumbling block for ontological liberalism if its proponents want to arrive somewhere less frustrating than tautology or apophatism. 23 The immediate implication of this deadlock is even more problematic, that is, the devaluation of metaphysics as such. Since ontological liberalism cannot abide any restriction on what it means to exist, any specification of the exact workings of relations between existents, which is the central task of metaphysics (as opposed to a purely descriptive ontology), is understood to be illegitimate, for fear that it might unduly exclude some things from existence. 24 The manner in which metaphysics is relegated to the sidelines varies from author to author, with Latour promoting the descriptive power of an empirically minded philosophy, while
Harman erects a strange introspective metaphysics. 25 Common to all of these attempts is a methodological deficit when it comes to formulating new insights, The philosopher is left to celebrate, even rhapsodize, beings in all their multiplicity, having cut himself off from any further understanding of this multiplicity beyond its mere presence and is thus relegated to a purely aesthetic stance. 31
Ontological and epistemic humility of this sort leaves philosophy in a position to declare nothing but its inability to saying anything about anything. 32
The Circumventing of Naturalism Having freed us, by their own criteria of success, from the shackles of metaphysics as such, ontological liberals now need to confront naturalism, which seems to be the last bastion of hierarchical taxonomies of being. Harman's "opinion that materialism must be destroyed," though here again it is Gabriel who puts forward the most severe interpretation of the liberal position. 36 Gabriel insists that he has no problem with the statements routinely produced by the sciences, because they deal with a specific field of sense -that of the "universe" 37 -whereas ontology cannot privilege or acknowledge that any fact or field of sense is regulative over it: "Nothing in this book is supposed to be supported by, to support, or to be in conflict with any true proposition of physics or any other inquiry into the material/energetic conditions of there being spatio-temporal objects, things, or events of any kind whose nature is described by them as being instances of mathematical equations." 38 Thus, according to Gabriel, ontological liberalism is harmless to the claims of natural science. However, if all fields of sense are on an equal footing, ontologically speaking, the claim to general truth attached to scientific statements melts into air. The problem is not that knowledge-based truth claims cannot be restricted to a particular domain of application (living beings for biological statements, mental beings for psychological ones, and so on) but rather that, by identifying those domains with
Gabriel's undifferentiated "fields of sense," it becomes impossible even to talk about knowledge, other than the strangely tautological version of knowledge in which the objects described by physics are defined as no more than that which is being studied by physicists in their professional practice and where any extension beyond this definition would be tantamount to a category mistake. 39 It is here that Gabriel's quarrel with naturalism reaches its most obvious 41. This aspect of his position Gabriel regards as a virtue: "But does this not mean that I am giving up any right to make a substantial explanatory claim based on the insight that to exist is to appear within a particular field? Well, it depends on what would count as a substantial explanatory claim here. The explanatory power the view has consists at least in being able to criticize positions in ontology that lead to metaphysical (hyper-substantial) claims in specific regions of philosophy or scientific discourse" (Fields of Sense, 192) .
the individuation of and the interaction between fields of sense are not topics to which he can contribute anything but these negative conditions, he cannot raise in any way the question of articulation between domains of knowledge production. 42 Take one of Gabriel's own examples -the issue of whether there is a specificity proper to living beings that would separate them from nonliving beings and inert matter. 43 Gabriel does not claim that such and such a kind of reduction (from the mental to the physical, for instance) is inadequate on either an empirical or a theoretical basis; instead he states that, given the purely conceptual difference between a heap of particles and a living being, we can say that, from our ontological standpoint, they are actually distinct. 44 The ontological radicalism yields only an explanatory void, as Gabriel is able to reify any conceivable distinction on purely a priori principles. When two accounts conflict, each is confined to a specific field of sense in order to establish an illusory peace. 45 The impossibility, even unthinkability, of any real contradiction existing between discordant theoretical accounts is the central weakness of Gabriel's position. As an antireductionism grounded on an inflationist ontology that rejects any limitation in the name of reality's fundamental heterogeneity, ontological liberalism ends up blind to any difference between the various realities that it seemingly wants to defend. 46 Liberalism, since its ontological framing of issues is ever-adjustable, has no way out of this problem of unfalsifiability. Gabriel's version of antinaturalism is extreme, to be sure, but it suggests that any resistance to ontological restraint leads to explanatory indifference. 47 44. Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 36, 142 -43. Similarly, for Garcia, writing from a formal-ontological viewpoint, "no thing is reducible to nothing" (Form and Object, 8) . When one has turned semantic categories into ontological ones, it is natural that purely verbal differences become ontological ones. The aversion toward reduction takes a strange form in the work of Harman (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) and Gabriel (Fields of Sense, 157), where they claim that to explain a thing using a concept amounts to identifying the thing explained with the concept.
A Very Relative Realism
45. In reading Fields of Sense, one learns, for instance, that witches, in the Inquisition's sense, do not exist but that they can be seen in Rhenish carnivals (Gabriel, Fields of Sense, 67); I can personally testify in the latter case, at least.
46. I am thinking of Latour's notion of the "category mistake" (Inquiry into Modes of Existence, 48), Harman's concept of "levels" (Quadruple Object, chap. 8), and Garcia's appeal to "emergence" (Form and Object, .
47. Nef 's review of Why the World Does Not Exist elaborates on this point.
realisms. The "new realist ontology" works by combining two discrete strands of realism, namely, commonsense realism (the claim that there are things in themselves, irreducible to mere constructions or representations) and noetic realism, as Wolfendale calls it (the claim that representations as such have their own specific being, with the same legitimacy as things in themselves). 48 This alliance is intended to produce a pluralist yet realist philosophy that is neither foundationalist nor reductionist, nor constructivist.
Commonsense realism is here, from a rhetorical standpoint, the most crucial strand, as it provides a "robust" interpretation of the notion of existence and thus, by its inclusion, draws a sharp line between Gabriel's position and postmodern constructivism as he describes it, with the same rhetoric being mobilized by the other ontological liberals. The conceptual content of commonsense realism;
however, is entirely dependent on the claims entailed by noetic realism: indeed, to know things in themselves, according to Gabriel, comes down to stating that appearances, insofar as they are produced by things in themselves, tell us that things in themselves appear in a certain way to us. We can know that a tree looks green, which is to say that it has the property of looking green to us. constructivism that he outspokenly denounces, the meaning of reality that he employs being indistinguishable from a certain kind of signifying procedure.
The exit strategy through ontology appears, then, to be a matter of smoke and mirrors. His kind of realism amounts to a minimal and abstract acknowledgment that reality is neither a social construction nor a product of individual human minds. 52 We can trace the origins of this version of realism to Gabriel's earlier books, and creative effort to trace relations among the multifarious forms of beingand his concept of "diplomacy," while failing to address the most pressing philosophical issues internal to his enterprise, productively turns our attention to concrete forms through which controversies may find resolution. Garcia's Form and
Object is awe-inspiring in the rigor with which it argues, in its first half, for the flattest possible ontology -and its second half, while unable to reach the same heights, is still rife with thought-provoking examinations of an extremely wide range of topics, which is the hallmark of philosophy at its most engaging. On the other hand, the confusion caused by the blurring of lines between metaphysics and phenomenology, ontology and epistemology, undermines the central concepts of Harman's philosophy (first among them, the concepts of object and relation). There are stimulating discussions of mereology, causality, and substance, in Harman's case, and of constitution and totality, in Gabriel's; in both, there are truly original interpretations of canonical figures such as Heidegger, Frege, and Kant. Yet, ultimately, ontological liberalism has proven itself to be an unsustainable project.
By exploring theoretical possibilities to their furthermost implications, radical conceptual experiments like these, in both their successes and their failures, are invaluable. There is much to be learned from the deadlocks to which liberalism has led its defenders. While ontological liberalism has not attained to "the magical formula we all seek: PLURALISM = MONISM" (as Deleuze and 
